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Abstract
We study the stochastic multi-armed bandits problem in the presence of adversarial
corruption. We present a new algorithm for this problem whose regret is nearly optimal,
substantially improving upon previous work. Our algorithm is agnostic to the level of
adversarial contamination and can tolerate a significant amount of corruption with virtually
no degradation in performance.
1 Introduction
We consider the stochastic multi-armed bandit problem with adversarial corruptions. The classi-
cal stochastic multi-armed bandits problem (Lai and Robbins, 1985) has long been studied, with
many algorithms including the Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) algorithm (Auer et al., 2002a)
and the Active Arm Elimination (AAE) algorithm (Even-Dar et al., 2006). (See, e.g., Bubeck et al.,
2012 for more details and many references.) Since the assumption that the rewards of the arms
are stochastic might appear quite rigid, the adversarial multi-armed bandit model has also been
studied, with algorithms like the Exp3 algorithm of Auer et al. (2002b).
The robustness of adversarial multi-armed bandit algorithms, however, comes at a heavy
price: their guarantees are often significantly weaker than those of stochastic algorithms, the
regret of which scales only logarithmically with the number of decision rounds. A natural ques-
tion is therefore: can we obtain results with guarantees that degrade smoothly as one goes from
the stochastic setting towards the adversarial one? More concretely, we can retain the favorable
guarantees of the stochastic setting while tolerating a small amount of adversarial corruption?
These questions were the focus of the recent work by Lykouris et al. (2018), who studied the
problem of stochastic multi-armed bandit with adversarial corruptions. They motivated it by
a variety of practical scenarios: these range from click fraud in pay-per-click advertisements, to
the presence of spam and malicious reviews in recommendation systems.
The model of Lykouris et al. (2018) is a variant of the classic stochastic multi-armed bandit
problem, where each pull of an arm generates a stochastic reward that may be contaminated
by an adversary before it is revealed to the player. The difficulty of the problem then scales
with the total amount of corruption introduced by the adversary. Lykouris et al. (2018) point
out that standard stochastic algorithms like UCB and AAE can suffer severely from corruptions
because the adversary, using a small amount of corruption, can cause the actual best arm to be
eliminated by the algorithm, and hence make it fail miserably. To address this, they show how
to add robustness to these algorithms at the cost of moderate degradation in performance.
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1.1 The model
Before proceeding, let us describe the setup in some more detail. A player is faced with K arms,
indexed by [K] := {1, 2, . . . ,K}. Each arm i ∈ [K] is associated with a reward distribution,
unknown to the player, with mean µi. The best arm i
⋆ = argmaxi µi is the one that maximizes
the expected reward; let µ⋆ = µi⋆ denote the maximal expected reward, and for any suboptimal
arm i 6= i⋆ consider its gap ∆i = µ⋆ − µi ∈ [0, 1]. The player interacts with the arms and has
to repeatedly decide on an arm to pull over the course of T decision rounds. This interaction is
contaminated by an adversary, that may corrupt the feedback observed by the player on at most
C of these T rounds. (The eventual definition of C will be a bit more general.) After each arm
pull, the player observes the possibly corrupted reward corresponding to that arm, and nothing
else; this is traditionally called “bandit feedback.” The player’s goal is to minimize her regret,
which is the difference between the total reward of the best arm and her own cumulative reward.
In this setting, the algorithm of Lykouris et al. (2018) achieves a regret bound of the form
O˜
(
KC
∑
i 6=i⋆1
/
∆i
)
.1 That is, their bound isO(KC) times worse than the standard O˜
(∑
i 6=i⋆1
/
∆i
)
bound achievable in the uncorrupted case by algorithms for the stochastic case such as UCB,
yet is still poly-logarithmic in the number of rounds T . Importantly, their algorithm is agnostic
to the level of corruption inflicted by the adversary and need not know the value of C ahead of
time. It is based on a “multi-layered” scheme that automatically adapts to the amount of adver-
sarial contamination: the first layer is the fastest but also the most susceptible to corruptions,
whereas the last is the most robust but is also the slowest to learn.
1.2 Our results
We show how to get significantly better regret bounds for stochastic multi-armed bandits with
adversarial corruptions. We give a new algorithm for the problem that attains a regret bound
which removes the multiplicative dependence on C appearing in the existing bounds and trades
it for an additive dependence. Our algorithm is entirely agnostic to the corruption level C, and
is also extremely simple. Formally, our main theorem is the following:
Theorem (Theorem 1, informal). There exists an algorithm for stochastic MAB with adversarial
corruptions (called BARBAR; see Algorithm 1 below), the regret of which is with high probability
at most
O(KC) + O˜
(∑
i 6=i⋆
1
∆i
)
.
To put the parameters in context, consider an instance withK arms and gaps∆i =
√
K/T ; in
the uncorrupted case, this is a prototypical hard instance where the minimax regret is Θ˜(
√
KT )
and is matched by both stochastic algorithms, like UCB, and adversarial algorithms, like Exp3.
(In fact, this instance was used to show the Ω(
√
KT ) lower bound for adversarial bandits by
Auer et al., 2002b.) In the corrupted case, however, algorithms for the stochastic case might
fail and suffer linear Ω(T ) regret. We are robust to corruptions up to the level C = O(
√
T/K),
obtaining essentially the same regret as in the uncorrupted case. In contrast, the previous
bounds from Lykouris et al. (2018) can only guarantee O(K1.5C
√
T ) regret, and thus suffer
from a degradation in performance due to the corruptions already at level C = O(1) while
becoming vacuous when C = Ω(
√
T/K).
In the uncorrupted case, where C = 0, our result recovers the classical bounds (achieved,
e.g., by the UCB algorithm) up to a logarithmic factor. We also show that under several different
conditions, it is possible to improve our regret bound and remove the factor of K from its first
term; we leave as an open question whether this is possible to achieve in the general, agnostic
case without any further assumptions.
1Here and throughout, the O˜ notation suppresses all dependence on logarithmic terms.
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1.3 Related work
Bridging between the stochastic and adversarial settings in multi-armed bandits, and in online
learning more generally, has been a topic of significant interest in recent years. Most research in
this direction has focused on obtaining “the best of both worlds” guarantees (Bubeck and Slivkins,
2012; Seldin and Slivkins, 2014; Auer and Chiang, 2016; Seldin and Lugosi, 2017; Zimmert and Seldin,
2018; Zimmert et al., 2019). The goal there is to achieve the better of the bounds at the two
extremes: the worst case O(
√
T )-type bound on any problem instance, and the better O(log T )-
type bound whenever the instance is actually stochastic. In particular, algorithms of this kind
cannot adapt to instances that are close to being stochastic, which are treated as fully adver-
sarial. The model we consider here aims to gradually interpolate between the two extremes, as
one goes from the stochastic setting and injects a moderate amount of adversarial corruptions.
Adversarial contaminations similar to those considered here have been studied before in the
context of bandit problems. Seldin and Slivkins (2014) and Zimmert and Seldin (2018) consider
a “moderately contaminated” regime in which the adversarial corruptions do not reduce the gap
mini 6=i⋆∆i by more than a constant factor at any point in time. This regime of contamination
is very restrictive and, for example, precludes virtually any form of corruption in the early
stages on learning. Kapoor et al. (2018) study a closely related model, where each step is
contaminated independently with probability η. They also study a contextual bandit model
where the corruption is adversarial, subject to the constraint that for any prefix, at most an
η fraction of the steps are corrupted. Altschuler et al. (2018) consider contaminated stochastic
bandits in the closely related best-arm identification setting, where rounds of a stochastic bandits
instance are contaminated uniformly at random by an “outlier” distribution, and the goal is to
identify the best arm in spite of the corruptions. This model of contamination is again weaker
than the adaptive adversarial model we consider here, and their goal is also somewhat different
than ours.
A somewhat different flavor of robustness in multi-armed bandits has been explored by
Bubeck et al. (2013). Their “Robust UCB” algorithm can tolerate heavy-tailed distributions of
rewards; namely, it does not require boundness or sub-Gaussianity of the rewards, and instead
only needs them to have bounded variance (or any higher-order moment). These ideas were
later adapted to other bandit settings (e.g., Yu et al., 2018; Shao et al., 2018).
Finally, we acknowledge the long line of research in statistics (Huber, 1964) and statistical
(batch) learning (Valiant, 1985; Kearns and Li, 1988) on making algorithms robust to various
kinds of adversarial perturbations. There have been several recent advances in computationally
efficient algorithms for problems of this kind; see, e.g., Diakonikolas et al. (2016); Lai et al.
(2016); Charikar et al. (2017); Diakonikolas et al. (2018); Klivans et al. (2018) and the references
therein.
2 Setup: Stochastic MAB with Adversarial Corruptions
We consider a multi-armed bandit problem with K arms, indexed by [K] = {1, 2, . . . ,K}. Each
arm i ∈ [K] is associated with an unknown reward distribution with mean µi; for simplicity we
assume that the reward distributions are all supported in [0, 1],in which case µi ∈ [0, 1]. We
let i⋆ = argmaxi µi denote the best arm, and let µ
⋆ = µi⋆ be the maximal expected reward.
Finally, for any arm i 6= i⋆ we define the gap ∆i = µ⋆ − µi ∈ [0, 1]; to simplify notation we
assume that the optimal arm is unique, in which case ∆i > 0 for all i 6= i⋆.
A player has to repeatedly choose an arm to pull and observe its reward as feedback, that may
be contaminated by an adversary; without loss of generality, we assume that the adversary is
deterministic. Formally, the interaction proceeds as follows. On each decision round t = 1, . . . , T :
(i) A stochastic reward Rti ∈ [0, 1] is drawn for each arm i from its reward distribution;
(ii) The adversary observes the vector Rt and generates corrupted rewards R˜t ∈ [0, 1]K ;
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(iii) The player picks it ∈ [K], possibly at random, and observes the corrupted reward R˜tit .
The player is evaluated using the standard metric in stochastic MAB models of pseudo-regret
(henceforth called simply regret; see remark below about other possible notions of regret), given
by
R(T ) =
T∑
t=1
(
µ⋆ − µit
)
.
We will be interested in bounding the player’s regret in terms of the level of corruption introduced
by the adversary. To this end, we measure the level of corruption C as:
C =
T∑
t=1
‖R˜t −Rt‖∞.
Our main focus will be on the case where C is unknown, and the player has to be agnostic
to the level of corruption.
Remarks. Notice that we allow the adversary to be adaptive, in the sense that the corruptions
on round tmay be determined as a function of the player’s past choices as well as of the stochastic
rewards in the current and previous rounds. (However, the corruption on round t is independent
of the choice of the player on the same round.) As a consequence, the corruption level C is
a random variable that depends on the stochastic rewards as well as on the player’s internal
randomization; the bounds we provide in this paper will depend on the realized value of this
random variable.
Also note that our definition of regret above is precisely the familiar pseudo-regret metric
ubiquitous in stochastic MAB models. Our results directly extend to several other notions of
regret; we discuss this in detail in Section 5.
3 The BARBAR Algorithm
At a high level, our algorithm is similar in spirit to the Active Arm Elimination (AAE) algorithm
for stochastic bandits, but contains some crucial modifications that make it robust to corruptions.
The algorithm proceeds in epochs which increase exponentially in length: the mth epoch has
length roughly 22m. At the beginning of each epoch m, the algorithm computes an empirical
estimate ∆m−1i of the gap of each arm i based on its pulls during the previous epoch; namely,
we take the difference between the reward-per-pull for arm i and a lower confidence bound for
the highest reward-per-pull of any arm in epoch m− 1. The algorithm uses these estimates to
bias towards pulling the seemingly-better arms: each arm is pulled roughly (∆m−1i )
−2 times, but
never more than 22m times, during epoch m. As a consequence, the algorithm never eliminates
an arm permanently; it gives the seemingly-not-so-good arms some recourse by pulling them
a small number of times in each epoch. This, along with the fact that each epoch only uses
information from the immediately preceding epoch, ensures that any corruption has a bounded
impact on the algorithm’s regret.
Formally, the BARBAR (Bandit Algorithm with Robustness: Bad Arms get Recourse) algo-
rithm is presented as Algorithm 1. The following is our main result: an O˜
(
KC +
∑
i 6=i⋆1
/
∆i
)
regret bound for the BARBAR algorithm.
Theorem 1. With probability at least 1− δ, the regret of Algorithm 1 is bounded by
O
(
KC +
∑
i 6=i⋆
log T
∆i
log
(K
δ
log T
))
.
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Algorithm 1 BARBAR: Bandit Algorithm with Robustness: Bad Arms get Recourse
1: Parameters: confidence δ ∈ (0, 1), time horizon T .
2: Initialize T0 = 0 and ∆
0
i = 1 for all i ∈ [K].
3: Set λ = 1024 ln(8Kδ log2T ).
4: for epochs m = 1, 2, . . . do
5: Set nmi = λ(∆
m−1
i )
−2 for all i ∈ [K].
6: Set Nm =
∑K
i=1 n
m
i and Tm = Tm−1 +Nm.
7: for t = Tm−1 + 1 to Tm do
8: choose an arm i with probability nmi
/
Nm and pull it.
9: Set rmi = Si/n
m
i where Si is the total reward from the pulls of arm i in this epoch.
10: Set rm⋆ = maxi{rmi − 116∆m−1i }
11: Set ∆mi = max{2−m, rm⋆ − rmi }
In Appendix B we give an example where our algorithm suffers Ω(KC) regret, showing that
our analysis is essentially tight. To convert the bound of Theorem 1 into a bound on the expected
regret of the algorithm, one can set δ = 1/T ; then, with the remaining probability the regret is
trivially bounded by T and the expected contribution to the regret is O(1). Thus, the expected
regret is bounded by
O
(
K E[C] +
∑
i 6=i⋆
1
∆i
log2(KT )
)
.
We now turn to prove Theorem 1. We start with a simple observation.
Lemma 2. The length Nm of epoch m satisfies
λ22(m−1) ≤ Nm ≤ Kλ22(m−1).
Moreover, the number of epochs M is at most log2 T .
Proof. The arm im achieving the maximum in the definition of r
m
⋆ has r
m
⋆ − rmim ≤ 0, so it has
∆mim = 2
−m. This immediately implies that Nm+1 ≥ nm+1im = λ(∆mim)−2 = λ22m. The upper
bound follows from the fact that each ∆mi is at least 2
−m, and so nm+1i ≤ λ22m for each i. The
bound on the number of epochs M follows from the lower bound on Nm.
Let Cim be the random variable denoting the sum of the corruptions in epoch m to arm i’s
reward, and let Cm := maxiC
i
m. Let n˜
m
i be the random variable denoting the actual number
of pulls of arm i in epoch m. We define an event E that captures the relevant tail bounds as
follows:
E :=
{
∀ m, i : |rmi − µi| ≤
2Cm
Nm
+
∆m−1i
16
and n˜mi ≤ 2nmi
}
. (1)
Lemma 3. It holds that Pr[E ] ≥ 1− δ.
The lemma is obtained from the following concentration inequalities concerning the reward
estimates rmi computed by the algorithm and the number of arm pulls n˜
m
i it uses.
Lemma 4. For any fixed i,m and any β ≥ 4e−λ/16, we have
Pr
[
|rmi − µi| ≥
2Cm
Nm
+
√
4 ln 4/β
nmi
]
≤ β and Pr[n˜mi ≥ 2nmi ] ≤ β.
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Proof. For this proof, we condition on all random variables before epoch m, so that nmi , Nm and
Tm−1 are deterministic quantities. At each step in this epoch, we pick arm i with probability
qmi := n
m
i
/
Nm. Let Y
t
i be an indicator for arm i being pulled in step t. Let R
t
i be the stochastic
reward of arm i on step t and cti := R˜
t
i−Rti be the corruption added to this arm by the adversary
in this step. Note that cti may depend on all the stochastic rewards up to (and including) round t,
and also on all previous choices of the algorithm (though not the choice at step t). Finally, if we
denote Em = [Tm−1 +1, . . . , Tm] be the Nm many time-steps in epoch m, then the first random
variable we aim to control can be expressed as
rmi =
1
nmi
∑
t∈Em
Y ti
(
Rti + c
t
i
)
.
For ease of analysis, let us break the sum above into two, and define
Ami =
∑
t∈Em
Y ti R
t
i, B
m
i =
∑
t∈Em
Y ti c
t
i.
Let us first bound the deviation of Ami . Observe that R
t
i is an independent draw from a [0, 1]-
valued r.v. with mean µi and Y
t
i is a independent draw from an {0, 1}-valued r.v. with mean qmi .
Moreover, we have that E[Ami ] = Nm · (qmi µi) = nmi µi ≤ nmi . Hence, by a Chernoff-Hoeffding
bound (a multiplicative version thereof; see Theorem 9 in Appendix A), we have
Pr
[∣∣∣∣Aminmi − µi
∣∣∣∣ ≥
√
3 ln 4/β
nmi
]
≤ β
2
. (2)
Next we turn to bound the deviation of Bmi . Consider the sequence of r.v.s X1, . . . ,XT
defined by Xt = (Y
t
i − qmi ) · cti for all t. Then {Xt}Tt=1 is a martingale difference sequence with
respect to the filtration {Ft}Tt=1 generated by the r.v.s {Y sj }j∈[K],s≤t, {Rsj}j∈[K],s≤t+1. Indeed,
since the corruption cti becomes a deterministic value when conditioned on Ft−1 (as we assume
a deterministic adversary), and since E[Y ti | Ft−1] = qmi , we have
E[Xt | Ft−1] = E[Y ti − qmi | Ft−1] · cti = 0.
Further, we have |Xt| ≤ 1 for all t, and we can bound the predictable quadratic variation of this
martingale as:
V =
∑
t∈Em
E[X2t | Ft−1] ≤
∑
t∈Em
|cti|Var(Y ti ) ≤ qmi
∑
t∈Em
|cti|.
Applying a Freedman-type concentration inequality for martingales (see Theorem 10 in Appendix A),
we obtain that except with probability β/4,
Bmi
nmi
≤ q
m
i
nmi
∑
t∈Em
cti +
V + ln 4/β
nmi
≤ 2 q
m
i
nmi
∑
t∈Em
|cti|+
ln 4/β
nmi
.
Since qmi = n
m
i
/
Nm and
∑
t∈Em
|cti| ≤ Cm, and further nmi ≥ λ ≥ 16 ln(4/β), we have with the
same probability that
Bmi
nmi
≤ 2Cm
Nm
+
√
ln 4/β
16nmi
.
Similar arguments show that −Bmi /nmi satisfies this bound except with probability β/4. It
follows that
Pr
[∣∣∣∣Bminmi
∣∣∣∣ ≥ 2CmNm +
√
ln 4/β
16nmi
]
≤ β
2
. (3)
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We can now combine Eqs. (2) and (3) using a union bound to get the claimed bound, conditioned
on the values of nmi , Nm, Tm. Finally, since the bound holds for any realizations of these r.v.s,
it also holds unconditionally.
For the second claimed bound, we use a Chernoff-Hoeffding bound (Theorem 9 in Appendix A)
on the random variable n˜mi =
∑
t∈Em
Y ti , when we again condition on past epochs and later re-
move the conditioning. The expected value is E[n˜mi ] = n
m
i ≥ λ, and the probability that the
r.v. is more than twice its expectation is at most 2 exp(−nmi /3) ≤ 2 exp(−λ/3) ≤ β. This
completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 3. We use Lemma 4 for each arm i and epoch m with β = δ
/
(2K log2 T ); this
value satisfies β ≥ 4e−λ/16. Since nmi = λ(∆m−1i )−2 and ln(4/β) = λ
/
1024 = λ
/
(4 · 162), the
lemma implies
Pr
[
|rmi − µi| ≥
2Cm
Nm
+
∆m−1i
16
and n˜mi ≥ 2nmi
]
≤ δ
K log2 T
.
A union bound over the K arms and the log2 T epochs concludes the proof.
For the rest of the analysis, we will condition on the event E . Our next step is to establish
upper and lower bounds on our estimate of the maximal reward rm⋆ in epoch m.
Lemma 5. Suppose that E occurs. Then for all epochs m,
−2Cm
Nm
− ∆
m−1
i⋆
8
≤ rm⋆ − µ⋆ ≤
2Cm
Nm
.
Proof. Recall that rm⋆ = maxi{rmi − 116∆m−1i }. In particular, rm⋆ ≥ rmi⋆ − 116∆m−1i⋆ ; plugging in
the lower bound on rmi⋆ implied by the event E , we get the left inequality. On the other hand,
plugging in the upper bound on rmi yields
rm⋆ ≤ max
i
{
µi +
2Cm
Nm
+
∆m−1i
16
− ∆
m−1
i
16
}
= max
i
{µi}+ 2Cm
Nm
= µ⋆ +
2Cm
Nm
.
We now establish upper and lower bounds on the gap estimate ∆mi of arm i on epoch m.
For all epochs m, define the discounted corruption rate
ρm :=
m∑
s=1
2Cs
8m−sNs
. (4)
Lemma 6. Suppose that E occurs. Then for all epochs m and arms i, it holds that
∆mi ≤ 2
(
∆i + 2
−m + ρm
)
.
Proof. The proof is by induction on m. For m = 1, the claim is trivially true for every i,
because ∆mi ≤ 1 ≤ 2 · 2−m. Next, suppose that the claim holds for m− 1. Using Lemma 5 and
the definition of the event E (cf. Eq. (1)), we write
rm⋆ − rmi = (rm⋆ − µ⋆) + (µ⋆ − µi) + (µi − rmi )
≤ 2Cm
Nm
+∆i +
2Cm
Nm
+
∆m−1i
16
.
Now using the induction hypothesis and the expression for ρm−1, we have
rm⋆ − rmi ≤ ∆i +
4Cm
Nm
+
1
8
(
∆i + 2
−(m−1) +
m−1∑
s=1
2Cs
8m−1−sNs
)
≤ 2
(
∆i + 2
−m +
m∑
s=1
2Cs
8m−sNs
)
= 2
(
∆i + 2
−m + ρm
)
.
Since ∆mi = max{2−m, rm⋆ − rmi }, the claim follows.
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Armed with this result, we now prove a lower bound on ∆mi .
Lemma 7. Suppose that E occurs. Then for all epochs m and arms i, it holds that
∆mi ≥ 12∆i − 3ρm − 342−m.
Proof. We write
∆mi ≥ rm⋆ − rmi
≥
(
µ⋆ − 2Cm
Nm
− ∆
m−1
i⋆
8
)
−
(
µi +
2Cm
Nm
+
∆m−1i
16
)
,
where we use Lemma 5 to give a lower bound on rm⋆ and Eq. (1) to give an upper bound on r
m
i .
Since ∆i = µ
⋆ − µi, the above expression is at least
≥ ∆i − 4Cm
Nm
−
(
∆m−1i⋆
8
+
∆m−1i
16
)
,
which using Lemma 6 can be further lower bounded by
≥ ∆i − 4Cm
Nm
−
(
3
8
ρm−1 +
3
8
2−(m−1) +
1
8
∆i
)
≥ ∆i
2
− 3
m∑
s=1
2Cs
8m−sNs
− 3
4
2−m.
Recalling the expression for ρm, the lemma follows.
We are now ready to bound the regret of Algorithm 1 and prove our main result.
Proof of Theorem 1. We will prove that the claimed bound holds true under the event E , which
occurs with probability at least 1− δ.
We decompose the total regret across epochs and within epochs, to the arms pulled. There
are n˜mi pulls of arm i in epoch m, each causing a regret of (µ
⋆ − µi). Thus the total regret can
be written as
M∑
m=1
K∑
i=1
(µ⋆ − µi)n˜mi ≤ 2
M∑
m=1
K∑
i=1
(µ⋆ − µi)nmi = 2
M∑
m=1
K∑
i=1
∆in
m
i . (5)
Fix an epoch m and an arm i and denote Rmi := ∆inmi . Recall that nmi = λ(∆m−1i )−2, and
consider three cases as follows.
Case 1: 0 < ∆i ≤ 4
/
2m. In this case we use the upper bound nmi ≤ λ22(m−1), which follows
from ∆m−1i ≥ 2m−1. This yields
Rmi ≤
4λ
∆2i
∆i =
4λ
∆i
. (6)
Case 2: ∆i > 4
/
2m and ρm−1 < ∆i
/
32. In this case, Lemma 7 implies that
∆m−1i ≥
1
2
∆i − 3ρm−1 − 3
4
2−(m−1) ≥ ∆i
(
1
2
− 3
32
− 3
8
)
=
1
32
∆i.
In turn, we have nmi = λ(∆
m−1
i )
−2 ≤ 322λ/∆2i from which it follows that
Rmi ≤
322λ
∆i
. (7)
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Case 3: ρm−1 ≥ ∆i
/
32 (and ∆i > 4
/
2m). This rearranges to ∆i ≤ 32ρm−1. We use again
the upper bound nmi ≤ λ22(m−1) so that
Rmi ≤ λ∆i22(m−1) ≤ 8λρm−122m. (8)
Considering the three cases, from Eqs. (6) to (8) we have for all arms i 6= i⋆ and epochs m that
Rmi ≤
322λ
∆i
+ 8λρm−12
2m,
and summing this over all epochs and arms, we have that the sum
∑M
m=1
∑K
i=1Rmi is bounded
by
322λ
∑
i 6=i⋆
log2 T
∆i
+ 8λ
∑
i 6=i⋆
( M∑
m=1
ρm−12
2m
)
.
For bounding the second term above, observe that
M∑
m=1
ρm−12
2m ≤
M∑
m=1
22m
(m−1∑
s=1
2Cs
8m−1−sNs
)
= 2
M∑
s=1
Cs
M∑
m=s
22m
8m−1−sNs
;
Since Ns ≥ λ22(s−1) (recall Lemma 2), the inner sum is upper bounded by
16
λ
M∑
m=s
4m−1−s
8m−1−s
≤ 16
λ
∞∑
j=1
2−j ≤ 16
λ
.
Combining the inequalities and plugging in the value of λ gives the claimed regret bound.
4 Better Bounds for Special Cases
In this section, we study a few special cases of the main model and show that under various
kinds of additional assumptions, we can obtain an improved regret bound in which the first term
O(KC) is improved to O˜(C). Some of these models are interesting in their own right; others
serve to suggest that a better bound of the form O˜
(
C +
∑
i 6=i∗1
/
∆i
)
may be achievable in the
general case.
4.1 Corruption at a fixed unknown rate
Consider the scenario each round is contaminated independently and uniformly at random by the
adversary with probability η ∈ (0, 1), which may be unknown to the player. From the point of
view of a stochastic bandits algorithm (such as Active Arm Elimination), this case is equivalent
to operating over an instance where the means µi’s are adversarially perturbed by ±η. (This
again can be seen from Lemma 4 with Cm = ηNm.) A regret bound of O˜
(
ηT +
∑
i 6=i⋆ 1
/
∆i
)
then follows.
4.2 Known corruption level
Now suppose that the corruption amount C is known to the player. In this case, consider the
classical Active Arm Elimination algorithm, with the modification that epoch m has length at
least Nm = Ω(C + 2
m log(K/δ)) which is ensured by pulling the winning arm sufficiently many
times. Even if all C corruptions fall in epoch m, Lemma 4 shows that the algorithm’s empirical
estimates of the means are accurate to within O˜(2−m). It can be then verified that an arm with
gap ∆i ≥ 2−m will be eliminated before epoch m + O(1) with high probability, leading to a
bound of O˜
(
C +
∑
i 6=i∗1
/
∆i
)
.
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4.3 Corruption on an unknown prefix
Assume that the adversary’s corruption is known to take place only in the first C steps, where
C may be unknown. In this case, the simple algorithm that plays AAE for steps [2m, 2m+1),
starting afresh each time has regret O˜
(
C +
∑
i 6=i⋆1
/
∆i
)
.
4.4 Known minimal gap
We can also obtain a similarly improved bound when the minimal gap ∆ = mini 6=i⋆ ∆i is known.
Consider the following variant of our algorithm: in each epoch m, play last epoch’s winning
arm 22m times and play every other arm λ
/
∆2 times. This algorithm gets regret K
/
∆ in each
epoch from all arms except the winning one. If the winning arm is i⋆, it causes no regret in
this epoch. For the winner to be an arm i 6= i⋆, the corruption in epoch m− 1 must be at least
Cm ≥ (∆i−∆/8)22(m−1) ≥ ∆i22(m−2). This results in an additional regret of O(∆i22m). Thus,
the overall regret is O˜
(
C +Kλ
/
∆
)
for any corruption level C.
4.5 Known maximal reward
Finally, consider the case where the player knows the value of µ⋆. For this case, we change the
algorithm so that ∆mi = max{2−m, µ⋆− rmi ,∆m−1i /2}; i.e., we use our knowledge of the optimal
bias, and moreover our estimates of the gaps does not drop very fast. In this case, we prove the
following variant of Lemma 7:
Lemma 8. Suppose that E occurs. Then for all epochs m and arms i, it holds that
∆mi ≥
∆i
2
− 2Cm
Nm
.
Proof. If ∆m−1i ≥ ∆i then the change in the algorithm ensures that ∆m−1i ≥ ∆mi
/
2. Otherwise,
Eq. (1) ensures that |rmi − µi| ≤ 2Cm
/
Nm +∆i
/
16. Now
∆mi ≥ µ⋆ − rmi ≥ (µ⋆ − µi)−
2Cm
Nm
− ∆i
16
≥ ∆i
2
− 2Cm
Nm
.
Hence the claim follows.
To bound the regret, the proof is similar to Theorem 1. Consider an arm i and epoch m such
that Cm
/
Nm ≤ ∆i
/
8. Lemma 8 implies that ∆mi ≥ ∆i
/
4, and hence the regret due to this arm
i in the next epoch m + 1 is nm+1i ∆i = λ(∆
m
i )
−2∆i ≤ O(λ
/
∆i). Summing this over all arms
and epochs gives us O˜
(∑
i 6=i⋆1
/
∆i
)
. Next, for arms i and epochs m where Cm
/
Nm ≥ ∆i
/
8,
the regret in the next round is nm+1i ∆i ≤ 4nmi ∆i, since we ensured that ∆mi ≥ ∆m−1i
/
2. Using
the fact that ∆i ≤ 8Cm
/
Nm, we have the regret is at most 32n
m
i Cm
/
Nm. Summing over all
the arms in this epoch m + 1 gives us 32Cm, and then summing over all rounds gives us 32C.
Hence, if we know µ⋆, the total regret is at most O(C) + O˜
(∑
i 6=i⋆1
/
∆i
)
.
5 Discussion
We conclude with a discussion of various aspects of our model and results.
5.1 A Lower bound
We show an Ω(C) lower bound for the pseudo-regret of any algorithm. Consider the case of
two arms with deterministic rewards 0 and 1, and consider an adversary that at each time step
swaps the rewards of the arms with probability 1/2. The expected total amount of corruption
is therefore T
/
2, and it makes the arms appear indistinguishable to the algorithm. Thus, with
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constant probability the algorithm will a suffer pseudo-regret of Ω(C). This lower bound for
C = T
/
2 can be extended to smaller C by placing this instance in the first 2C steps. In other
words, for the pseudo-regret under this contamination model there is a lower bound of Ω(C)
that holds for all C up to T
/
2. Moreover this lower bound holds even for the case of known C.
5.2 Alternative notions of regret
So far we have focused on the pseudo-regret metric, which is the most common in stochastic
bandit problems. One might consider several other possible notions of regret. First, the realized
regret with respect to the actual corrupted rewards may be of interest:
R′(T ) = max
i∈[K]
T∑
t=1
(
R˜ti − R˜tit
)
.
Under this metric, not only do the adversarial corruptions perturb the feedback observed by
the player, but they also affect the rewards she gains. As we discuss in Appendix C, any high-
probability bound on the pseudo-regret also implies a high-probability bound on the realized
regret, and our upper bounds transfer directly (up to a logarithmic factor) to this notion as well.
Note that for this notion of regret one could also attain an O(
√
T )-type regret bound, at
any level of corruption C, using an adversarial bandits algorithm like Exp3. On the other
hand, Lykouris et al. (2018) show a lower bound of Ω(C1−δ) on the regret for any algorithm
that gets regret O(log2−ε(T )/∆) for the uncorrupted case, for any ǫ, δ > 0. This lower bound
still leaves open the possibility of obtaining a “best of all worlds” type guarantee that smoothly
interpolates between the favorable stochastic guarantees and the robust adversarial results, which
is meaningful even for C = Ω(
√
T ). (For example, one might allow for slightly suboptimal
O(polylog(T )/∆) regret in the non-corrupted case, which invalidates the latter lower bound.)
However, recalling the original motivation for our problem, the above realized regret is ar-
guably not the “correct” notion. In the motivating scenarios, such as click fraud or recommen-
dation poisoning by fake reviewers, the rewards coming from the corruptions (the outliers) are
not of interest, and in fact, the goal is to perform well on the non-corrupted rewards (the in-
liers). The corresponding definition of regret for such cases would take into account only the
non-corrupted steps:
R′in(T ) = max
i∈[K]
∑
t/∈C
(
R˜ti − R˜tit
)
,
where C is the set of steps in which there was some corruption.2 Our upper bounds, as well as
the simple Ω(C) lower bound argued above, immediately extend to this notion as well.
As a consequence, this definition of regret does not admit o(C)-regret bounds for any C,
and one cannot hope for a robust O(
√
T )-type regret guarantee that would hold for any level
of corruption. How do we square this with the O(
√
T )-type upper bounds that hold for the
classical definition of regret, achieved by adversarial algorithms like Exp3? On the instance
used to show the Ω(C) lower bound above, those algorithms will balance the linear regret on
the inlier steps with a linear negative regret on the outlier steps.
5.3 Open questions
Our work leaves a gap between the lower bound of Ω(C) and the upper bound of O(KC), closing
which is a compelling open question. Improving the log2 T dependence in our expected regret
bound to log T is another interesting problem for future investigation. Finally, it would also
be interesting to extend our results to other online prediction settings, e.g., linear bandits and
contextual bandits.
2Here we assume a slightly more restrictive definition of the corruption level, where C is the total number of
rounds corrupted by the adversary. This definition is consistent with most of the motivating scenarios discussed.
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A Concentration Inequalities
In our analysis we require multiplicative versions of standard concentration inequalities, that
provide sharper rates for random variables with small expectations. First, we state a standard
multiplicative variant of the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound.
Theorem 9 (e.g., Dubhashi and Panconesi 2009, Theorem 1.1). Suppose that X1, . . . ,XT are
independent [0, 1]-valued random variables, and let X =
∑T
t=1Xt. Then for any ǫ > 0,
Pr
[|X − E[X]| ≥ ǫE[X]] ≤ 2 exp(−ǫ2
3
E[X]
)
.
Equivalently, for any δ > 0,
Pr
[
|X − E[X]| ≤
√
3E[X] ln
2
δ
]
≥ 1− δ.
Next, we record a variant of Freedman’s martingale concentration inequality, taken from
Beygelzimer et al. (2011). (Technically, the concentration inequality in Beygelzimer et al. (2011)
is stated for the filtration generated by the martingale itself; the proof however extends straight-
forwardly to more general filtrations.)
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Theorem 10 (Beygelzimer et al. 2011, Theorem 1). Suppose that X1, . . . ,XT is a martingale
difference sequence with respect to a filtration {Ft}Tt=1, and let X =
∑T
t=1Xt. Assume that
|Xt| ≤ b for all t, and define V =
∑T
t=1 E[X
2
t | Ft−1]. Then for any δ > 0,
Pr
[
X ≤ V
b
+ b ln
1
δ
]
≥ 1− δ.
B Tightness of Our Analysis
Here we give an example where our algorithm suffers regret Ω(CK), showing that the first term
in our analysis is tight. Consider the case where the rewards of the arms are µ1 = 1 and µi = 0
for all i 6= 1. In the uncorrupted case, for each epoch m ≥ 1 we have ∆m1 = 2−m and ∆mi = rm⋆ =
1− 1−(1/16)m15 ∈ [14/15, 15/16]. Consequently, the mth epoch has length Nm = λ(22(m−1) +O(K))
as long as we see no corruptions.
Suppose C = Nc = λ(2
2(c−1) + O(K)) for some c > 2 log2K, say. In our example, all the
corruptions happen in epoch c. Specifically, we corrupt the high-value arm to also have payoff
zero in all Nc time-steps in this epoch. This causes r
c
⋆ ≤ 0 and all ∆ci = 2−c: in essence we
lose all information from the previous epochs. Therefore the length of the next epoch becomes
Nc+1 = λK2
2c ≈ 2KC which is K times as much; moreover, each arm is pulled λ22c ≈ C times
in this epoch. The regret just from this epoch is ≈ (K − 1)C, which shows we indeed need the
factor of K multiplying the C term in the regret for our algorithm.
C From Pseudo-regret to Regret
Here we show how a (high probability) bound over the pseudo regret can be converted to a
bound into a (high probability) bound over the actual, realized regret in a black-box fashion.
We assume the regret is defined based on the uncorrupted stochastic rewards; the analogous
notion that uses the corrupted rewards is only an additive O(C) larger in the worst case. As
a consequence, our (positive) results regarding the pseudo regret immediately extend to the
realized regret with respect to either the corrupted or uncorrupted rewards.
Using the notation established in Section 2, recall that the pseudo regret is given by
R =
T∑
t=1
(
µ⋆ − µit
)
=
∑
i 6=i⋆
Ti∆i,
where Ti is the number of times arm i was pulled. On the other hand, the (realized) regret is
the quantity
R′ = max
i∈[K]
T∑
t=1
(
Rti −Rtit
)
.
Suppose that we have established a bound Pr(R ≤ B) ≥ 1− δ on the pseudo regret, where
B ≥ maxi 6=i⋆ 1
/
∆i. We want to establish a high-probability bound on R′. Define the quantity:
R⋆ =
T∑
t=1
(
Rti⋆ −Rtit
)
.
We will separately bound R′−R⋆ and R⋆−R. Applying Azuma’s inequality on the random
variable R⋆ −R we have with probability at least 1− δ that
R⋆ −R ≤
√∑
i 6=i⋆
Ti ln
1
δ
.
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Applying Holder’s inequality,
R⋆ −R ≤
√∑
i 6=i⋆
Ti∆i · 1
∆i
ln
1
δ
=
√√√√(∑
i 6=i⋆
Ti∆i
)
·
(
max
i 6=i⋆
1
∆i
ln
1
δ
)
.
Now, since B is a bound over the pseudo-regret we have that R = ∑i 6=i⋆ Ti∆i ≤ B with
probability at least 1− δ. We have therefore shown that with probability at least 1− 2δ,
R⋆ −R ≤
√
Bmax
i 6=i⋆
1
∆i
ln
1
δ
.
On the other hand, another application of Azuma’s inequality shows that with probability
≥ 1− δ,
R′ −R⋆ ≤ max
i∈[K]
(
−∆iT +
√
T ln
K
δ
)
.
If mini 6=i⋆ ∆i ≥
√
ln(K/δ)/T , then this difference is negative. Otherwise, it is bounded as
R′ −R⋆ ≤
√
T ln
K
δ
≤ max
i 6=i⋆
1
∆i
ln
K
δ
.
Also, we have maxi 6=i⋆ 1
/
∆i ≤ B by assumption. It follows that with probability at least 1−3δ,
R′ ≤ B
(
1 +
√
ln
1
δ
+ ln
K
δ
)
.
Note also that if B−1 ln Kδ ·
(
maxi 6=i⋆1
/
∆i
)
is bounded by a constant (as it typically is), then R′
is at most O(B).
15
